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FINDING THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT 
FOR PRESCHOOLERS UNDER THE IDEA: AN 
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
Theresa M. DeMonte 
Abstract: Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, both school- and 
preschool-age children who qualify for special education services are entitled to education in 
the least restrictive environments appropriate to their needs. For school-age children, the 
presumptive least restrictive environment is the regular class where their nondisabled peers 
participate. By contrast, defining an analogous environment for preschool children is 
difficult, because public schools rarely provide preschool for children without disabilities. 
This Comment argues that the Act’s language, principles, purposes, and implementing 
regulations suggest that the settings where a preschool child’s nondisabled peers learn should 
be identified as that child’s presumptive least restrictive environment. Examples of such 
settings may include the home, community, and regular preschool. This Comment then 
provides an analytical framework that courts can use when determining the least restrictive 
environment for a preschool child. 
INTRODUCTION 
Nate is an adorable three-year-old whose favorite activities at 
preschool include singing at circle time, digging in the sand table, and 
playing restaurant in the pretend kitchen.1 Though a casual observer 
might not immediately notice, Nate displays the classic symptoms of 
autism, including repetitive behaviors, restricted interests, impaired 
social skills, and disordered communication. Despite his significant 
impairments, Nate has been successfully participating in regular2 
preschool with the help of a trained aide who prompts him to respond 
appropriately to his teacher and peers. 
Having heard that preschoolers with disabilities are entitled to 
educational services under federal law, Nate’s parents approach the local 
school district. After conducting an evaluation, the district tells Nate’s 
parents that he qualifies for services and may attend the district’s autism 
preschool program for two hours per day. The classroom consists of six 
children, all diagnosed with autism, taught by one teacher and two aides. 
                                                     
1. The author created this hypothetical for illustrative purposes. 
2. Throughout this Comment, the term “regular” environments refers to public and private 
educational settings designed for the general population, while “special” environments are those 
designed specifically to meet the needs of children with disabilities. 
Demonte_DTPed[1].doc (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2010 2:43 PM 
158 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:157 
 
Nate’s parents urge the school district to consider keeping Nate in a 
preschool where he could participate with nondisabled children. The 
school district administration informs the parents that they only fund 
public programs. Because the district does not provide regular 
preschools for nondisabled children, Nate’s parents are told they will 
either need to accept the autism preschool program or continue to fund 
the private program themselves. 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) entitles 
children with disabilities, including preschool children such as Nate, to 
individualized educations in the least restrictive environment (LRE) 
appropriate to their needs.3 Despite this requirement, parents of 
preschool children sometimes face obstacles with its implementation and 
find themselves torn between educating their child in a regular preschool 
or community setting at their own expense or foregoing a placement 
alongside nondisabled peers in order to secure free special education 
services.4 The IDEA presumes that children will be educated in regular 
educational environments, unless their individual needs dictate that a 
special class or school is required.5 Therefore, this Comment will refer 
to regular educational settings as the “presumptive” least restrictive 
environment. The presumptive least restrictive environment for school-
age children is the regular class where nondisabled children are 
educated, and moving a child to a special setting requires justification 
based on the child’s needs.6 However, schools are often uncertain which 
environment constitutes the presumptive least restrictive environment 
for preschoolers—in part because there are often no generally available 
public education settings for nondisabled preschool children.7 
This uncertainty about how the LRE provisions apply to preschoolers 
                                                     
3. The IDEA entitles qualifying children ages three through twenty-one to receive a “free 
appropriate public education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2006). An individualized education 
program is to be crafted for each child, id. § 1412(a)(4), and under a provision titled “Least 
restrictive environment,” a child is to be educated with children who are not disabled “to the 
maximum extent appropriate,” id. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
4. See infra Part III (citing cases in which schools denied preschool students placements in 
regular settings). 
5. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2008) (denoting special classes and 
special schools as distinct from regular classes). 
6. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (noting that “removal of children with disabilities from the regular 
educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such 
that education in regular classes . . . cannot be achieved satisfactorily”). 
7. Alefia Mithaiwala, Comment, Universal Preschool: A Solution to a Special Education Law 
Dilemma, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 373, 386–87 (discussing the preschool “LRE dilemma” and 
arguing that it exists “because most school districts do not have regular public preschool options for 
their three- to five-year-old population”). 
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is ripe for clarification, and the critical importance of early intervention 
for disabled children8 makes the LRE issue particularly high-stakes for 
this population. The Supreme Court has never decided an LRE case—
much less one applying the requirement to preschoolers—and lower 
federal courts diverge on what constitutes the presumptive least 
restrictive environment for preschoolers.9 Although legal journals 
provide a plethora of articles focusing on how the LRE requirement 
applies to older children,10 they are short on scholarship dealing with 
these requirements as they apply to preschoolers.11 This Comment helps 
resolve this uncertainty by explaining how the statutory and regulatory 
provisions of the IDEA apply to preschoolers. 
Part I presents the history of the IDEA as it pertains to preschool 
students with disabilities, and Part II explores the background of its key 
provisions. Part III summarizes federal cases where preschool placement 
was at issue and shows that courts have applied differing analyses to the 
preschool LRE context. Part IV draws on the text of the IDEA, its 
                                                     
8. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, at IV-33 (2002), 
available at http://www.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2002/section-iv.pdf (reporting findings 
that document many positive results for children and their families after one year of early 
intervention). 
9. Some of the circuit courts have adopted their own tests to discern whether a child is being 
educated in the least restrictive environment. E.g., Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 
14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting a four-factor balancing test requiring courts to 
consider the educational and non-academic benefits of regular settings as well as the cost involved 
and the effects of the student on the teacher and other children); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 
874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989) (adopting a two-part test in which courts determine whether 
education in the regular class can be achieved satisfactorily before deciding whether the child has 
been mainstreamed to the maximum extent appropriate); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 
(6th Cir. 1983) (adopting a test applicable when “a segregated facility is considered superior” 
requiring courts to determine whether similar services can be feasibly provided in a non-segregated 
setting); see infra Part III. 
10. See Stacey Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 2006 BYU EDUC. & 
L.J. 189; Sarah E. Farley, Comment, Least Restrictive Environments: Assessing Classroom 
Placement of Students with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 77 WASH. L. REV. 809 (2002); Joshua 
Andrew Wolfe, Note, A Search for the Best IDEA: Balancing the Conflicting Provisions of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1627 (2002) (arguing that the LRE 
requirements conflict with the requirements for a free appropriate public education and need to be 
reconciled); Marc C. Weber, Response, A Nuanced Approach to the Disability Integration 
Presumption, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 174 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/ 
10-2007/Weber.pdf. 
11. The author found only one scholarly law journal article directly addressing the LRE 
provisions as they apply to preschoolers. The article proposed universal preschool as a catch-all 
solution, but did not explain how states without universal preschool were currently obligated under 
the IDEA to provide the LRE to preschoolers—the issue this Comment seeks to resolve. See 
Mithaiwala, supra note 7. 
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purposes, and its history to propose a framework courts should apply 
when the least restrictive environment for a preschool child is at issue. 
Courts should look first to the settings that the child’s same-aged peers 
are learning in to determine the child’s presumptive least restrictive 
environment. Second, they should ask whether the child can be 
successfully educated in these settings. This approach best implements 
the principles of the IDEA and comports with Congress’s preference that 
children with disabilities receive their educations in regular settings. 
I.  THE IDEA REFLECTS CONGRESS’S INCREASING 
EMPHASIS ON INCLUSION AND FAMILY-CENTERED 
EARLY INTERVENTION 
The IDEA had its genesis in a movement of parents and educators 
fighting to secure public education for children with disabilities. These 
efforts spanned the twentieth century12 and gained inspiration from both 
the broader civil rights movement13 and the belief that inclusion in 
public education could help children with disabilities gain 
independence.14 As momentum grew for nationwide change, Congress 
responded by enacting legislation that conditioned funding to the states 
on whether they provided children with disabilities access to appropriate 
public education.15 Later, as research increasingly suggested that earlier 
intervention led to better outcomes, the right-to-education movement 
sought to improve services to preschoolers.16 
                                                     
12. See LEOPOLD LIPPMAN & I. IGNACY GOLDBERG, RIGHT TO EDUCATION: ANATOMY OF THE 
PENNSYLVANIA CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5 (1973). 
13. See id. at 12–15 (noting that the groundwork for a key “[r]ight to [e]ducation” case was laid 
by Brown v. Board of Education). 
14. See id. at 12–13 (noting that others drew on the language in Brown that education “is a 
principal instrument for . . . helping [a child] to adjust normally to his environment. It is doubtful 
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education” and applied it to children with disabilities (internal citations omitted)). 
15. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006)). 
16. This research was presented to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare by 
parents, teachers, and experts in special education. See S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 1, 81–82 (1975), 
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1425, 1479 (“[W]e feel that it is imperative to point out that 
the benefits of early identification and education, both in terms of prevention of future human 
tragedy, and in the long-term cost effectiveness of tax dollars, are so great as to justify continued 
emphasis upon preschool education for handicapped children.”). The continued efforts of advocates 
led to the passage of laws providing broader services to preschoolers. See infra Part I.B. 
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A.  By Enacting Comprehensive Special Education Reforms, Congress 
Recognized Two Principles: The Right to Educational Opportunity 
and the Right to Integration 
As recently as the mid-1970s, schools across the nation routinely 
excluded millions of children with disabilities or warehoused them in 
inadequate special education programs.17 Although it took many years 
for this issue to gain national prominence, local efforts addressing the 
problem began as early as the end of the nineteenth century, when some 
cities established special classes for mildly impaired children.18 
Heartened by the possibilities such schools offered, parents of children 
with disabilities formed local grassroots organizations and advocated for 
their children’s right to education.19 
These groups’ tireless advocacy bore fruit: their efforts persuaded 
many legislators and school boards that the benefits of educating 
disabled children were worth the costs.20 California became the first state 
to mandate special education services for cognitively impaired children, 
and several other states followed suit.21 
As their children began receiving long-sought special education, 
parents began to view the frequent segregation of their children from 
regular classrooms as unjust.22 The Court’s landmark decision in Brown 
v. Board of Education,23 holding that separate education based on race is 
inherently unequal,24 resonated with many advocates for children with 
disabilities.25 They adopted the rhetoric of the civil rights movement and 
looked to the courts to vindicate these children’s rights.26 
                                                     
17. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (congressional findings). 
18. LIPPMAN & GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 5 (1973) (noting that Providence, Springfield, 
Boston, and Chicago began offering special classes for cognitively impaired children before 1900). 
19. See id. at 10–11. The influence of these local groups converged in 1950 when parents founded 
the National Association for Retarded Children (NARC), which was among the first national 
organizations to advocate on behalf of children with disabilities. See id. 
20. See id. 
21. Id. at 6 (“[B]y the early 1950s first California and then other states were beginning to mandate 
special educational services for the mentally retarded.” (internal citation omitted)). 
22. See id. at 10. 
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
24. Id. at 493. 
25. See LIPPMAN & GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 12–13 (1973). 
26. See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that exclusion 
of children with disabilities from schools violated procedural due process and equal protection); Pa. 
Ass’n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258–59 (E.D. Pa. 1971) 
(noting that action brought on behalf of mentally retarded children deprived of free public education 
alleged in its complaint the unconstitutionality of such practices under the Equal Protection Clause). 
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Across the country, advocates filed lawsuits asserting that schools 
were excluding children with disabilities from public education in 
violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Constitution.27 In many cases, the decisions confirmed that children with 
disabilities were entitled to educations suited to their needs.28 States 
without laws addressing the education of disabled children responded by 
passing laws entitling children with disabilities to appropriate 
educations.29 
By 1975, all but two states had enacted such legislation.30 Despite 
these laws, many states were unable to accommodate all children, and 
claimed that lack of funds hindered their compliance.31 With millions of 
children in limbo—unable to receive the services to which they were 
legally entitled—Congress took action. In 1975, it enacted a 
comprehensive national policy called the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act (EAHCA).32 This law amended the Education of the 
Handicapped Act, and conditioned federal funds on the provision of free 
appropriate public educations to children with disabilities.33 By creating 
incentives for the states to adopt federal policy, Congress took a more 
active role in enabling children with disabilities to become productive 
citizens.34 
                                                     
27. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 3–4 (1975) (noting that since PARC and Mills there had been 
forty-six completed or pending cases in twenty-eight states). 
28. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 7 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1431 (noting that 
more than thirty-six court decisions had recognized that children with disabilities have the right to 
receive appropriate educations); see, e.g., Mills, 348 F. Supp. 866; PARC, 334 F. Supp. 1257. 
29. See Frederick J. Weintraub & Joseph Ballard, Introduction: Bridging the Decades, in 
SPECIAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA: ITS LEGAL AND GOVERNMENTAL FOUNDATIONS 1, 3 (Joseph 
Ballard et al. eds., 1982). 
30. Id. 
31. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 7, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1431 (noting that lack of 
financial resources had prevented compliance with court decisions requiring states to educate 
children with disabilities). 
32. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006)). 
33. Id. § 612, 89 Stat. at 780 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412) (“In order to qualify for 
assistance . . . a State shall demonstrate . . . that the . . . State has in effect a policy that assures all 
handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education.”). 
34. See S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433 (“[O]ver the past 
few years, parents of handicapped children have begun to recognize that their children are being 
denied services which are guaranteed under the Constitution. It should not, however, be necessary 
for parents throughout the country to continue utilizing the courts to assure themselves a remedy. It 
is this Committee’s belief that the Congress must take a more active role under its responsibility for 
equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped children are provided equal educational 
opportunity. It can no longer be the policy of the Government to merely establish an unenforceable 
goal requiring all children to be in school.”). 
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B.  Congress Has Increasingly Emphasized Early Educational 
Intervention for Preschoolers with Disabilities 
The 1975 amendments did not ensure that preschool children would 
receive the same entitlements as school-age children with disabilities. 
While the EAHCA generally required states to educate children with 
disabilities ages three to twenty-one, it exempted states from educating 
children ages three through five if doing so was inconsistent with state 
law or practice.35 States that elected to educate a subset of preschool 
children with disabilities, however, were subject to the requirements of 
the EAHCA with respect to those children.36 Thus, states could dodge 
the Act’s requirements by declining to serve preschoolers altogether.37 
The lack of a full mandate for preschool education in the final bill 
was contentious.38 The Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped had 
proposed a version that mandated services for children ages three 
through five.39 In the hearings preceding the EAHCA’s passage, 
Congress heard ample testimony that preschool-age children stood to 
benefit the most from special education services because early 
intervention could ameliorate the disabling effects of many conditions.40 
Ultimately cost concerns trumped these arguments, and after being 
reported to the full committee, the preschool mandate was dropped.41 
Several dissenting senators acknowledged the states’ fiscal concerns, but 
emphasized that foregoing a full preschool mandate could cost taxpayers 
more education dollars in the long run because children deprived of  
effective early educational intervention may require more intensive 
services later.42 
                                                     
35. See id. at 18–19, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1442–43 (listing the reasons a state 
could be exempted, and noting that the exemption did not apply when a state tried to abandon 
providing services). 
36. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 612, 89 Stat. 
773, 780–81 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2006)). 
37. Assuming, that is, that the state was not abandoning services previously provided. See S. REP. 
NO. 94-168, at 18–19, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1442–43. 
38. The Senate Report included the dissenting views of five senators who asserted that failure to 
provide a full mandate for preschool children “diluted” the commitment of the Act to such children 
and cited testimony indicating that “special educational services provided to handicapped children 
before ‘normal’ school age were often the most beneficial, since much more could be done at an 
earlier age to ameliorate, alter, or develop skills to compensate for certain handicapping conditions.” 
Id. at 81–82, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1479–80. 
39. Id. at 82, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1480. 
40. Id. at 81–82, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1479–80. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. (“We are cognizant of the concerns of the States regarding their financial capacity to 
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In the wake of the EAHCA, the cost-benefit debate continued. Ten 
years after its enactment, only twenty-one states and the District of 
Columbia offered educational services to all preschool children with 
disabilities.43 To remedy this, Congress amended the Education for the 
Handicapped Act in 1986,44 giving states greater incentives to serve all 
qualifying preschool children with disabilities beginning at age three.45 
These amendments also added provisions that conditioned grants on 
providing services to infants and toddlers with disabilities from birth 
through age two.46 In addition to offering states a carrot in the form of 
increased funding, the new law also came with a stick: states that failed 
to provide free appropriate public educations to all qualifying 
preschoolers by 1991 risked losing funds and grants they received under 
the old law.47 
Most of the key features of the 1986 amendments remain today, and 
all states currently provide education to preschool children with 
qualifying disabilities.48 
                                                     
provide a [sic] full educational services to this group of children. Nevertheless, we feel that it is 
imperative to point out that the benefits of early identification and education, both in terms of 
prevention of future human tragedy, and in the long-term cost effectiveness of tax dollars, are so 
great as to justify continued emphasis upon preschool education for handicapped children.”). 
43. H. REP. NO. 99-860, at 42 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2401, 2444 (“Currently, all 
states participate in the state grant program for children 6 to 17, but as of July 1985, only 21 states, 
4 territories, and the District of Columbia served all handicapped children from age 3.”). 
44. See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457, 100 Stat. 
1145 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. (2006)). 
45. Pascal L. Trohanis, An Introduction to PL 99-457 and The National Policy Agenda for 
Serving Young Children with Special Needs and Their Families, in POLICY IMPLEMENTATION & PL 
99-457: PLANNING FOR YOUNG CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS 1, 5–13 (James J. Gallagher et al. 
eds., 1989). 
46. Id. at 2–3. 
47. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457, § 619(b)(1), 
100 Stat. 1145, 1156 (“[T]he Secretary shall make a grant to any State which . . . has a State 
plan . . . which includes policies and procedures that assure the availability under the State law and 
practice of such State of a free appropriate public education for all handicapped children aged three 
to five, inclusive.”); see Trohanis, supra note 45, at 13 (“[T]he new law builds in some penalties for 
states that do not achieve a full mandate for FAPE covering 3- through 5-year-olds by the 1990–
1991 school year. Failure to comply will result in loss of the new preschool grant money, as well as 
funds generated under Part B of the State Plan formula for this population group, as well as 
designated EHA discretionary grants, including those for research, training, and demonstration 
activities.”). 
48. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, at II-76 (2005), 
available at http://www.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/index.html (listing all fifty states under a 
table tallying children ages three through five served under the IDEA) [hereinafter TWENTY-
SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT]. 
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C.  The IDEA and Its Amendments Expressed a Stronger Commitment 
to Educating Preschoolers in a Seamless Fashion in the Least 
Restrictive Environment 
In 1990, Congress reauthorized the Education for the Handicapped 
Act and renamed it the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA).49 The following year, Congress enacted amendments50 in part to 
“facilitate the development of a comprehensive ‘seamless’ system of 
services for children, aged birth to 5, inclusive, and their families . . . .”51 
The amendments required that services for infants and toddlers take 
place in “natural environments,” including home and community 
settings, “to the maximum extent appropriate.”52 Additionally, the new 
law required states to develop policies and procedures to ensure a 
smooth transition for children as they prepared to enter public school.53 
The amendments also allowed the service plan of an infant or toddler to 
continue through age five whenever appropriate.54 
The IDEA’s 1997 amendments explicitly included the term “least 
restrictive environment,”55 which had previously appeared only in the 
implementing regulations.56 The Department of Education issued 
subsequent regulations stating that the LRE provisions apply fully to 
preschool children.57 
Congress most recently amended the IDEA in 2004 by passing the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act.58 In doing so, 
                                                     
49. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901(a)(1), 
104 Stat. 1103, 1141–42. 
50. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
119, 105 Stat. 587. 
51. H.R. REP. NO. 102-198, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 310, 313. 
52. IDEA Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-119, § 12, 105 Stat. 587, 595–596 (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1432(4)(G) (2006)). 
53. Id. § 5, 105 Stat. 587, 591 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(9)). 
54. Id. § 6, 105 Stat. 587, 591 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(B)). 
55. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
17, § 612, 111 Stat. 37, 61 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2006)). 
56. Jean B. Crockett, The Least Restrictive Environment and the 1997 Amendments and Federal 
Regulations, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 543, 552 (1999) (“There is no definition given in this section for the 
term LRE, but a cross-reference is made to Sec. 1412 (a)(5)(A) where the term now appears, for the 
first time, within the text of the law. . . . The words “least restrictive environment” have officially 
been transferred from the federal regulations into the statute.”). 
57. Id. at 555–56 (“References to the LRE provisions can be found explicitly in several sections 
of the reauthorized federal code. . . . A reference that these LRE provisions apply to preschool 
children with disabilities now appears in [then] Sec. 300.552.”). 
58. Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006)). 
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Congress highlighted the IDEA’s primary purpose of preparing children 
with disabilities for integrated adult lives59 by requiring each child’s 
educational plan to address functional, as well as academic, areas of 
limitation.60 In its findings, Congress emphasized that the education of 
children with disabilities would be enhanced by “strengthening the role 
and responsibility of parents and ensuring that families of such children 
have meaningful opportunities to participate in the education of their 
children at school and at home.”61 
The central role the family plays in the child’s education is 
particularly evident with respect to very young children. The law 
currently provides that an interdisciplinary team will craft an 
Individualized Family Service Plan for infants and toddlers.62 The plan 
must include a statement of the family’s strengths and needs that relate 
to the enhancement of the child’s development, and a statement of 
outcomes expected for the family as a whole and for the child as an 
individual.63 
The modern IDEA reflects Congress’s commitment to promoting 
individualized, inclusive educations for children with disabilities.64 The 
Act entitles such children to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) 
                                                     
59. “Improving educational results for children with disabilities is an essential element of our 
national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and 
economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2006) 
(congressional findings). 
60. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II) (2006) (“[An individualized education program includes] 
a statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals, designed 
to . . . meet the child’s needs that result from the child’s disability to enable the child to be involved 
in and make progress in the general education curriculum.” (emphasis added)). For preschool 
children, such goals might address self-help activities, social skills, and participation in the 
community. 
61. Id. § 1400(c)(5)(B). 
62. Id. § 1436; see id. § 1436(d) (requiring that the plan contain a statement of the family’s 
resources, priorities, and concerns, as well as a statement of outcomes or results expected for the 
family as a whole). Congress took a family-systems approach in drafting the Individualized Family 
Service Plan requirements because it “recognized that the capacity of infants and toddlers to 
succeed in any educational program depends on that child’s family” and an effective effort to help 
infants and toddlers must “includ[e] the goal of enhancing families’ capacity to meet the special 
needs of their infants and toddlers with disabilities.” Matthew J. Stowe & H. Rutherford Turnbull 
III, Legal Considerations of Inclusion for Infants and Toddlers and for Preschool-Age Children, in 
EARLY CHILDHOOD INCLUSION: FOCUS ON CHANGE 79 (Michael J. Guralnick ed., 2001). 
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1436(d)(2)–(3). 
64. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A). Not all children who have impairments that might be considered a 
disability will necessarily qualify to receive services under the IDEA. The IDEA defines “child with 
a disability” as a child having at least one of a list of enumerated impairments and who, “by reason 
thereof, needs special education and related services.” Id. § 1401(3)(A). 
Demonte_DTPed[1].doc (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2010 2:43 PM 
2010] PRESCHOOL PLACEMENTS UNDER THE IDEA 167 
 
from ages three through twenty-one.65 The educational services a child 
receives are listed on the child’s individualized education program (IEP), 
a written plan crafted by a multidisciplinary team that includes the 
child’s parents.66 The IDEA also expresses Congress’s preference that 
children with disabilities be educated in regular environments alongside 
their nondisabled peers when consistent with their needs.67 If the child’s 
parents believe the IEP fails to confer a free appropriate public education 
in the least restrictive environment, they may challenge its adequacy68 by 
pursuing mediation or requesting a due process hearing before an 
impartial hearing officer.69 After exhausting administrative remedies, 
parents can file a civil action in state or federal court.70 
II.  THE IDEA ENSURES AN “APPROPRIATE” EDUCATION IN 
THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT 
The IDEA entitles qualifying preschool children to the same benefits 
as their school-age counterparts: a free appropriate public education in 
the least restrictive environment.71 The meaning and application of these 
entitlements has been contested,72 and the special situation of preschool 
children raises even more difficulties.73 
A.  Congress Crafted Procedures to Assure Appropriate, 
Individualized Educations for Children with Disabilities 
Congress requires that the environment in which a child with 
disabilities is educated—his or her placement—be in the least restrictive 
environment in which the substantive content of the child’s IEP can be 
successfully implemented, with the use of supplementary aids and 
                                                     
65. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A). 
66. See id. § 1414(d). 
67. See id. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
68. Id. § 1415(b). 
69. Id. § 1415(f). 
70. Id. § 1415(i)(2). 
71. See id. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (“A free appropriate public education is available to all children with 
disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive.”); id. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“To 
the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are educated with children who are 
not disabled.”). 
72. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187 (1982) (contesting provision of free 
appropriate public education); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 
(9th Cir. 1994) (contesting LRE); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 
1989) (contesting LRE). 
73. See infra Part II.D.3. 
Demonte_DTPed[1].doc (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2010 2:43 PM 
168 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:157 
 
services.74 The substantive content of the child’s IEP is delivered when a 
child can achieve his or her individual annual goals.75 The IEP team 
crafts these goals with an eye to helping the child bridge the educational 
gap his or her disability creates.76 The team describes this educational 
gap in a statement explaining how the student’s disability “affects the 
child’s involvement and progress in the general education curriculum,”77 
which is the same curriculum as that used for nondisabled children.78 
There is no general curriculum for preschool children;79 instead, the 
statute instructs that a preschooler’s statement may describe how the 
disability affects his or her participation in “appropriate activities” for 
that age group.80 
“Appropriate activities” has a potentially expansive meaning that is 
not limited by the Act or its regulations. In response to public comments, 
the Department of Education explained that “appropriate activities” 
refers to “age-relevant developmental abilities or milestones that 
typically developing children of the same age would be performing or 
would have achieved.”81 The IEPs of preschool children are designed to 
improve the child’s participation in appropriate activities and thereby 
receive the appropriate educations they are entitled to under the IDEA. 
B.  Courts Have Struggled to Define the Meaning of “Appropriate 
Education” 
At the center of the IDEA is the right to receive a free appropriate 
public education.82 The Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the 
                                                     
74. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1412. 
75. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). 
76. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(II). The child’s annual goals serve the purpose of “meet[ing] 
the child’s needs that result from the child’s disability to enable the child to be involved in and 
make progress in the general education curriculum; and meet each of the child’s other educational 
needs that result from the child’s disability.” Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II). 
77. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(aa). 
78. Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,535, 
12,592 (Dep’t of Educ. Mar. 12, 1999) (describing the general curriculum as “the same curriculum 
as for nondisabled children”). 
79. Id. at 12,593 (noting that preschool children are “of an age for which there is not a general 
curriculum for nondisabled children”). 
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(bb). 
81. Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and the Early Intervention 
Program for Infants and Toddlers With Disabilities; Final Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,405, 12,471 
(Dep’t of Educ. Mar. 12, 1999). 
82. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A)–(D). This section defines a free appropriate public education as: 
[S]pecial education and related services that (A) have been provided at public expense, under 
public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State 
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word “appropriate” in the seminal case Board of Education v. Rowley,83 
holding that an education is not appropriate within the meaning of the 
Act unless both procedural84 and substantive standards are met.85 The 
Supreme Court first found that the Act’s statutory findings and text 
suggested that Congress primarily intended to provide disabled children 
with access to education, and did not intend to guarantee a particular 
educational outcome.86 
The Court held that the requisite procedural standard for an 
“appropriate” education is achieved when schools comply with 
statutorily specified procedures, and the substantive standard is reached 
when a child’s educational program consists of individualized special 
education and related services that are calculated to confer an 
educational benefit.87 
After Rowley, lower courts grappled with an issue the Court failed to 
address—what level of educational benefit meets the appropriate 
standard? Rowley foreclosed the interpretation that “appropriate” 
requires a potential-maximizing benefit; the broadest possible reading of 
Rowley suggests that an education is “appropriate” when a child receives 
some educational benefit, no matter how insignificant.88 Lower courts 
                                                     
educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary 
school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the 
individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title. 
Id. (formatting modified for brevity). Although the IDEA was enacted in 1990, the free appropriate 
public education requirement has been in force since the EAHCA was enacted in 1975. See 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 612, 89 Stat. 773, 780 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2006)). 
83. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
84. Id. at 206–07. Congress envisioned the IEP procedural requirements as the primary 
guarantors of substantive validity. The legislative history from PL 94-142 suggests that the 
procedures surrounding evaluation, eligibility determinations, placement, and prior written notice 
requirements were the primary way Congress sought to ensure that children received appropriate 
educations. The Senate Report notes: 
[T]he individualized written educational plan . . . would require school systems to develop an 
expertise and ability to provide services guaranteed to assure educational progress . . . . [By 
emphasizing] the process of parent and child involvement and to provide a written record of 
reasonable expectations, the Committee intends to clarify that such individualized planning 
conferences are a way to provide parent involvement and protection to assure that appropriate 
services are provided to a handicapped child. 
S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 11–12 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1435–36. 
85. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206–07. 
86. Id. at 192 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 11 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 
1435). Also, the Court noted that Congress did not intend to optimize the education of each child 
with a disability. Id. at 197 n.21. 
87. Id. at 201, 203–04. 
88. See id. at 203 (indicating that an appropriate education must “permit the child to benefit 
educationally”). 
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largely rejected this reading, reasoning that Congress would not have 
spent millions of dollars and repeatedly emphasized individualized 
instruction unless it intended to confer more than a de minimis 
educational benefit; instead, they have held that an appropriate education 
is one that is designed to provide a meaningful educational benefit.89 
Courts use different formulations to assess the substantive 
appropriateness of an IEP, but relevant factors may include the child’s 
current abilities,90 the child’s potential,91 whether the educational benefit 
is non-trivial,92 and whether significant learning occurred.93 
C.  Courts Had Applied the Principle of Least Restriction to Other 
Contexts 
The history and purposes of the least restrictive alternative movement 
lend context to the LRE provisions in the Act and provide a backdrop 
against which the placement of preschoolers can be examined. The LRE 
requirements had their genesis in the legal principle that the government 
cannot impinge on individuals’ rights without justification, a principle 
long recognized by American jurisprudence.94 Broadly stated, the least 
                                                     
89. Lower courts have stated this requirement differently. See, e.g., Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. 
of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 862 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e agree that the IDEA requires an IEP to confer a 
‘meaningful educational benefit’ gauged in relation to the potential of the child at issue.”); L.T. v. 
Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2004) (“IDEA does not require a public school to 
provide what is best for a special needs child, only that it provide an IEP that is ‘reasonably 
calculated’ to provide an ‘appropriate’ education.” (quoting Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 
910 F.2d 983, 992–93 (1st Cir. 1990))); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (noting that an appropriate education “must be gauged in relation to child’s potential” 
and that it requires “significant learning” and “meaningful benefit” (quoting Polk v. Cent. 
Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182–85 (3d Cir. 1988))); Polk, 853 F.2d at 180 
(“[T]he [IDEA] calls for more than a trivial educational benefit.”). But cf. Devine v. Indian River 
County Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 1289, 1292–93 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has 
said that a student is only entitled to some educational benefit,” and holding that plaintiff failed to 
show that his IEP was “not reasonably calculated to confer the basic floor of educational benefits”). 
90. See Deal, 392 F.3d at 864. 
91. Id. at 862; T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 578 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 
Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 247). 
92. Polk, 853 F.2d at 180. 
93. Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 247 (citing Polk, 853 F.2d at 182). 
94. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230–31 (1821) (promoting “the least 
possible power adequate to the end proposed” as the extent to which the government may punish 
(emphasis added)). Scholars disagree on the origins of the least restrictive alternative principle. See, 
e.g., JAMES W. ELLIS ET AL., THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 
65 n.11 (1981) (citing Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), holding that a milk 
inspection scheme was overly broad and infringed on interstate commerce interests, as the first 
instance of the Supreme Court recognizing the least restrictive alternative principle); Scott A. Fields 
& Benjamin M. Ogles, The System of Care for Children and the Least Restrictive Alternative: Legal 
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restrictive alternative principle proposes that government actions that 
deprive an individual of liberty or property should be narrowly tailored 
to achieve state interests or confer benefit to the individual, and that the 
least intrusive or stigmatizing means are preferred.95 The least restrictive 
alternative principle finds roots in both procedural and substantive due 
process doctrines, as well as equal protection principles.96 Courts began 
applying the least restrictive alternative principle to mental health 
contexts in the 1960s and 1970s by requiring proof that less restrictive 
settings were not appropriate before committing a mentally ill individual 
to an institutional setting.97 
The least restrictive alternative principle spread to the field of special 
education as concerns grew that the purported benefits of exclusion did 
not outweigh the negative effects resulting from the stigma and lowered 
expectations associated with segregated settings.98 These same concerns 
spurred Congress to adopt the least restrictive environment requirements 
in the 1975 Education for all Handicapped Children Act.99 
D.  The LRE Requirement Reflects Congress’s Preference for 
Educating Children in Regular Settings 
Like all children served by the IDEA, preschool children are entitled 
to participate in the least restrictive environment that meets their 
needs.100 This Section examines how Congress has used the LRE 
principle to express a strong preference for regular settings through 
statutory language that prioritizes inclusiveness and endorses a 
continuum approach to determining a child’s least restrictive learning 
                                                     
Origins and Current Concerns, 5 CHILD. SERVICES: SOC. POL’Y, RES., & PRAC. 75, 76–77 (2002) 
(citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), holding that a law requiring teachers to divulge all 
memberships is more intrusive than is needed to meet the state’s legitimate interest in assessing the 
competence of its schoolteachers, as the first instance of the Supreme Court recognizing the least 
restrictive alternative principle); David Zlotnick, First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive Alternative 
Analysis and the Right of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 375, 385 (1981) 
(citing Anderson, 19 U.S. at 230–31, as first enunciating the least restrictive alternative principle). 
95. See ELLIS, supra note 94, at 17. 
96. Id. at 21–25. 
97. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095–96 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding that 
Wisconsin’s commitment procedures violated procedural and substantive due process and reasoning 
that the mentally ill cannot be deprived of their liberty without a showing that less drastic 
alternatives cannot achieve the same purposes of keeping the individual and society safe). 
98. See Note, Enforcing the Right to an “Appropriate” Education: The Education for all 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1119–20 (1978–1979). 
99. See id. at 1121. 
100. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006). 
Demonte_DTPed[1].doc (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2010 2:43 PM 
172 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:157 
 
environment. Despite Congress’s expressed preference, preschool 
children with disabilities are included in regular and inclusive 
environments less often than school-age children with disabilities. 
1.  The Statutory LRE Requirement Expresses a Strong Preference for 
Inclusive Settings 
The LRE provisions require a child’s placement to be no more 
restrictive than necessary to effect an appropriate education. The 
strongly-worded primary LRE provision, which has remained essentially 
the same since 1975,101 reveals Congress’s concern for children educated 
in segregated environments: 
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with 
disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not disabled, 
and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of 
children with disabilities from the regular educational 
environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the 
disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with 
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved 
satisfactorily.102 
The statutory language, permitting removal “only when” the child’s 
disability prevents the child from being satisfactorily educated in regular 
class, is mandatory.103 The IEP team must describe the extent to which a 
child will not participate in regular classes, extracurricular offerings, and 
nonacademic activities as well as the reasons justifying removal.104 
2.  The Department of Education Implementing Regulations Conceive 
Restriction as Occurring on a Continuum 
The IDEA assumes that a child’s placement will be in the regular 
educational environment. But when a child cannot be educated 
satisfactorily in that environment, even with supplementary aids and 
                                                     
101. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006), with 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1976) (current 
version at 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2006)). The only change has been that the words “disability” and 
“disabled” have been substituted for “handicap” and “handicapped.” The 1975 version reads: “[T]o 
the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children . . . are educated with children who are not 
handicapped, and that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children 
from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the handicap is 
such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be 
achieved satisfactorily.” 
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
103. See id. 
104. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V). 
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services, removal is required to the extent necessary to achieve a free 
appropriate public education.105 Special classes, special schools, and 
institutions are among the special environments available to meet the 
child’s needs.106 
In recognition that special environments are not equally restrictive, a 
regulation titled the “Continuum of alternative placements” 
conceptualizes placements as occurring on a continuum of restriction.107 
This regulation provides: 
(a) Each public agency must ensure that a continuum of 
alternative placements is available to meet the needs of children 
with disabilities for special education and related services. 
(b) The continuum . . . must (1) [i]nclude the alternative 
placements listed . . . (instruction in regular classes, special 
classes, special schools, home instruction, and instruction in 
hospitals and institutions); and (2) [m]ake provision for 
supplementary services (such as resource room or itinerant 
instruction) to be provided in conjunction with regular class 
placement.108 
This regulation obligates public agencies to make a continuum of 
alternative placements available.109 The continuum, starting with regular 
classes and ending with institutions, is usually interpreted as moving 
from the least to the most restrictive settings.110 Thus, the level of 
restriction increases as the child is removed from the “regular 
educational environment” and moved further along the continuum of 
restriction. 
3.  Preschool Children with Disabilities Participate in Regular 
Classrooms Less Often than Their School-Age Counterparts 
The LRE provisions apply fully to preschoolers.111 However, 
                                                     
105. See Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“To the maximum extent appropriate, children . . . are educated 
with children who are not disabled . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
106. 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2008). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. (formatting modified for brevity). 
109. Id. § 300.115(a). 
110. See, e.g., D.B. v. Ocean Twp. Bd. of Educ., 985 F. Supp. 457, 490 (D.N.J. 1997) (“Just as 
placement in a regular class with supplementary aids and services is at one end of the continuum of 
alternate placements required to be made available to special education students under IDEA, 
placement at a completely segregated, full time residential facility is at the other end of that 
continuum.” (citing Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1400 (D. N.J. 1992), aff’d, 995 F.2d 
1204 (3d Cir. 1993))). 
111. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116 (2008) (“In determining the educational placement of a child with a 
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preschool-age children are not currently included in regular 
environments to the same extent as school-age children with 
disabilities.112 For example, in its 2005 report to Congress on IDEA 
implementation, the Department of Education found that only 34% of 
preschoolers were served in settings designed for children without 
disabilities, and over one-third were served in classes designed primarily 
for children with disabilities.113 In contrast, 60.3% of children in the six-
to-eleven age bracket were served primarily in a regular class and only 
15% were outside the regular class for more than 60% of the day.114 
While some barriers have been identified, the reasons for this 
discrepancy between preschoolers and school-age children remain 
uncertain. Researchers and scholars have posited that barriers to placing 
preschoolers in less restrictive settings include lack of resources at the 
district level, stakeholder attitudes, and difficulty coordinating 
services.115 In particular, the LRE requirement presents implementation 
challenges when preschoolers are involved because there is often no 
ready-made, publicly provided environment that clearly fits the bill as 
least restrictive. For school-age children, regular public school is the 
least restrictive environment possible.116 No obvious analogue exists for 
preschoolers for two reasons. First, many school districts do not provide 
regular public education for preschool-age children because most states 
do not begin compulsory education until age six or older.117 Second, it is 
uncertain that formal preschools are necessarily the “regular educational 
environment” for all nondisabled preschoolers because many children do 
not attend any preschool, while others wait until age four or five.118 
                                                     
disability, including a preschool child with a disability, each public agency must ensure that— (a) 
the placement decision . . . [i]s made in conformity with the LRE provisions.” (emphasis added)). 
112. TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 48, at 24–25. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 45. 
115. See Virginia Buysse et al., Implementing Early Childhood Inclusion: Barrier and Support 
Factors, 13 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 169 (1998); Eileen M. Borden, Local Variations in Least 
Restrictive Environment Placements for Preschool Children with Disabilities: Results of a Pilot 
Study, Presented at the 28th Annual Conference of the Northeastern Educational Research Ass’n 
(1997) (Ed.D. dissertation, State University of New York), http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ 
ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/17/90/ab.pdf. 
116. Sch. Comm. v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (“The [IDEA] contemplates that 
such education will be provided where possible in regular public schools . . . but the Act also 
provides for placement in private schools at public expense where this is not possible.” (citing 
statutory authority)). 
117. See Education Commission of the States, Compulsory School Age Requirements (2005), 
http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/50/51/5051.htm (last updated September 2005). 
118. In 2005, more than half of three-year-olds and one-third of four-year-olds were not enrolled 
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Many of these nondisabled preschool children instead participate in 
community settings such as the home or daycare.119 
School districts trying to comply with the LRE requirement have 
grappled with the unique situation of preschoolers and have arrived at 
different solutions. To create access to nondisabled peers, some schools 
pay for tuition at private preschools or daycares.120 Others create 
“mixed” special education center-based programs that invite 
participation from nondisabled children in varying ratios so that children 
with IEPs have exposure to nondisabled peers.121 These schools are 
operating in the absence of clear guidance from Congress or courts as to 
which, if any, of these alternatives is the presumptive least restrictive 
environment for their students. This lack of clarity plays out in schools’ 
differing conclusions. This ambiguity can lead to disagreement between 
parents and schools, requiring the courts to review preschool placements 
to ensure compliance with the LRE requirement in light of Congress’s 
intent. 
III.  COURTS APPLY THE LRE PROVISIONS INCONSISTENTLY 
WHEN PRESCHOOL PLACEMENTS ARE CHALLENGED 
Only a handful of federal opinions directly address the LRE 
requirement as it applies to preschoolers. The outcomes can be roughly 
divided into two categories: those upholding segregated special 
education placements as the least restrictive environment, and those 
upholding inclusive preschools designed for nondisabled children as the  
least restrictive environment. This Part traces representative decisions to 
underscore the conflict. 
                                                     
in a preschool education program. See W. Steven Barnett & Donald J. Yarosz, Preschool Policy 
Brief: Who Goes to Preschool and Why Does it Matter?, 15 NAT’L INST. OF EARLY EDUC. RES.: 
POL’Y BRIEF SERIES 1, 5 (2007), available at http://nieer.org/resources/policybriefs/15.pdf. 
119. See id. at 5. 
120. See, e.g., Editorial, Improving Preschool Special Education, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1996, at 
A16. 
121. See, e.g., Samuel L. Odom & Don Bailey, Inclusive Preschool Programs: Classroom 
Ecology and Child Outcomes, in EARLY CHILDHOOD INCLUSION: FOCUS ON CHANGE 253, 260–61 
(Michael J. Guralnick ed., 2001) (discussing inclusive preschool programs with varying ratios of 
children with and without disabilities). 
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A.  Courts Upholding Segregated Placements Tend to Discount the 
Congressional LRE Mandate While Emphasizing the Burdens 
Schools Face in Placing Preschoolers in Regular Programs 
One of the first cases in which a segregated special education 
preschool classroom was held to constitute the least restrictive 
environment was Mark A. v. Grant Wood Area Education Agency.122 
Alleah A., a child with cerebral palsy, had been attending Handicare, a 
private integrated daycare dedicated to fostering interaction between 
children with and without disabilities.123 When Alleah turned three, the 
local education agency recommended placement in a special education 
preschool program consisting entirely of children with disabilities but 
housed in a regular elementary school.124 
Alleah’s parents wished her to remain at Handicare and challenged 
the proposed placement.125 The Eighth Circuit affirmed that the 
segregated placement was appropriate.126 Notably absent from the 
opinion is a finding that Alleah’s needs could not be met in the 
integrated setting; the court assumed that Alleah could receive 
meaningful educational benefit in either the segregated or integrated 
setting.127 Reasoning that the public agency only had to provide an 
appropriate, rather than best, placement for Alleah, the court held that 
the special education preschool was an appropriate placement and that 
the LRE requirement did not dictate a contrary result.128 
The Mark A. court pointed out that Alleah’s class would be located 
within an elementary school that served nondisabled children.129 The 
court also noted that Iowa, where Alleah resided, did not have integrated 
public preschool programs.130 It concluded, “[w]hile the Act mandates 
that handicapped children receive, to the extent possible, an appropriate 
public integrated education, it does not compel the state to establish 
entire new levels of public education services to satisfy the Act’s 
                                                     
122. 795 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986). 
123. Id. at 53. 
124. See id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 54. 
127. See id. at 54 (implicitly acknowledging that Alleah’s needs could be better met at Handicare: 
“[a]lthough Handicare may indeed offer the best educational opportunities” (emphasis in original)). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. (“Alleah, at the very least, will be educated in the same school with nonhandicapped 
children.”). 
130. Id. 
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mainstreaming requirements.”131 
More than twenty years later, an unpublished decision from the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia adopted similar 
reasoning when it failed to acknowledge that regular preschool may be 
necessary to meet the LRE requirements for some children. In M.W. v. 
Clarke County School District,132 M.W., a three-year-old boy with 
autism, was placed in a self-contained autism classroom consisting of at 
least three adults working with no more than six children.133 After a few 
months, M.W.’s parents became concerned that he was imitating the 
idiosyncratic and repetitive behaviors of his classmates.134 They 
requested a due process hearing135 and unilaterally removed him from 
the autism preschool program after they became convinced that he was 
regressing.136 They enrolled him in a private preschool and sought 
reimbursement for their expenses on the grounds that M.W. had been 
denied an education in the least restrictive environment.137 
At the administrative hearing, M.W.’s mother testified that children in 
the autism preschool classroom were hitting, kicking, moaning, 
screaming, and crying; her testimony was bolstered by audiotapes of the 
classroom she had surreptitiously recorded while visiting.138 The 
administrative law judge found that the recordings were not necessarily 
representative of the school day139 and reasoned that “since the [school 
district] does not have its own public school program for non-disabled 
three-year-old students, within the continuum of services provided 
directly by the [district], M.W. was in the least restrictive 
environment.”140 
On appeal, the district court reviewed the administrative judge’s 
findings and dismissed the complaint.141 The district court, however, did 
not directly address the LRE issue—despite testimony that M.W. 
flourished in his private preschool among nondisabled children—
because the court found that M.W.’s parents did not meet their burden in 
                                                     
131. Id. 
132. No. 3:06-CV-49, 2008 WL 4449591 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2008). 
133. Id. at *3. 
134. Id. at *4. 
135. Id. at *5. 
136. Id. at *6–7. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at *6. 
139. Id. at *6 n.11. 
140. Id. at *9 (citing Final Decision of the ALJ paragraph 92). 
141. Id. at *1–2 (granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint). 
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showing that the private preschool was an appropriate placement.142 In a 
footnote, the court observed that the IDEA prefers public schools over 
private schools and that the district’s autism program was calculated to 
provide educational benefits.143 Therefore, the court reasoned, “it is 
unclear whether Defendant was required to consider private placement at 
all once it determined that its own direct services classroom would 
provide M.W. with FAPE.”144 The decision implies that so long as a 
child receives an education calculated to confer benefits, the LRE 
requirement does not have independent significance, at least at the 
preschool level where the only regular programs available may be 
private.145 
B.  Courts Supporting Regular Preschool Placements Find Congress’s 
Mandatory LRE Provisions Controlling, Despite the Difficulties 
Posed to Schools 
In contrast to the two cases discussed above, the Seventh, Third, and 
Tenth Circuits have applied different reasoning to hold that educational 
agencies must consider paying for private preschool programs when the 
only publicly run preschool programs available are designed for children 
with disabilities or academic difficulties.146 
In the first of these cases, Board of Education of LaGrange School 
District v. Illinois State Board of Education,147 the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals considered the situation of Ryan B., a child with Down 
syndrome.148 When Ryan was two, his parents placed him in a private 
preschool where he learned alongside nondisabled children.149 After 
Ryan’s third birthday, the school district determined he was eligible for 
services under the IDEA.150 The district initially recommended placing 
Ryan in a program consisting entirely of disabled children but later 
offered to consider placing Ryan in a program designed for preschool 
                                                     
142. Id. at *9. 
143. Id. at *9 n.16. 
144. Id. 
145. See id. 
146. See L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004); T.R. ex rel. N.R. v. 
Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2000); Bd. of Educ. of LaGrange Sch. Dist. v. 
Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 184 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1999). 
147. 184 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1999). 
148. Id. at 914. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
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children at risk of academic failure.151 After observing the “at risk” 
classroom, his parents requested a due process hearing, alleging that the 
school district did not offer Ryan a program that would provide an 
appropriate education in the least restrictive environment.152 The district 
court agreed, and on the school district’s appeal the United States 
Department of Education filed an amicus brief supporting Ryan’s 
position.153 
On appeal, the school district argued that the segregated classroom 
should be considered Ryan’s least restrictive environment because it was 
housed in a regular elementary school.154 The school district stressed that 
the regulations suggested placing preschool children in Head Start as a 
way to meet the LRE requirement, and argued that the “at risk” program 
comported with this suggestion.155 
The court of appeals rejected the school district’s arguments and held 
that a special class—even if housed in a regular school—was more 
restrictive than necessary because Ryan would benefit from a regular 
setting.156 Moreover, the court decided that the “at risk” program was not 
the least restrictive environment for Ryan.157 Refusing to analogize the 
“at risk” preschool to Head Start, the court noted that the children in the 
                                                     
151. Id. 
152. See id. 
153. Id. 
154. See id. at 915. In making this argument, the school district relied on implementing regulation 
commentary dealing with the least restrictive environment, providing: 
Public agencies that do not operate programs for nondisabled children are not required to 
initiate such programs to satisfy the requirements regarding placement in the LRE . . . . For 
these public agencies, some alternative methods for meeting the requirements include (1) 
Providing opportunities for participation (even part time) of preschool children with disabilities 
in other preschool programs operated by public agencies (such as Head Start); (2) Placing 
children with disabilities in private school programs for nondisabled preschool children or 
private preschool programs that integrate children with disabilities and nondisabled children; 
and (3) Locating classes for preschool children with disabilities in regular elementary schools.
In each case the public agency must ensure that each child’s placement is in the LRE in which 
the unique needs of that child can be met, based on the child’s IEP, and meets all of the other 
requirements of [relevant regulations]. 
Id. at 915–16 (citing commentary to 34 C.F.R. § 300.552). The school district contended that since 
it complied with this alternative, it was relieved of any further obligation under the LRE provision. 
Id. This commentary has since been removed from the regulations. 
155. Id. (noting that “[t]he School District argues that the Project IDEAL/At-Risk program is a 
FAPE because it is similar to Head Start, and thus meets the first alternative provided in the 
commentary to 34 C.F.R. § 300.552”). 
156. See id. at 917 (“[W]e agree that the Brook Park placement is not a FAPE for Ryan within the 
meaning of the IDEA because it does not provide the least restrictive environment in which his 
individual needs can be met.”). 
157. Id. (“[T]he At-Risk program offered by the School District was not sufficient to provide the 
least restrictive environment for Ryan, based on his unique needs.”). 
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“at risk” program were selected because they were all at risk of 
academic failure, while Head Start selected children based exclusively 
on income.158 Because the “at risk” program—unlike Head Start—
excluded all children expected to perform typically, it could not be a 
“regular” classroom.159 The school district was required to pay for 
Ryan’s private preschool tuition because none of the school district’s 
proposed placements met the LRE requirement.160 
On the heels of LaGrange School District, a Third Circuit decision 
applied similar reasoning to different facts and held that a mixed class 
including nondisabled children was not a “regular” class and therefore 
not the least restrictive environment. In T.R. ex rel. N.R. v. Kingwood 
Township Board of Education,161 the board offered five-year-old N.R. a 
placement in a regular kindergarten, but N.R.’s parents wanted him to 
remain in preschool because state law did not require enrollment in 
kindergarten until age six.162 The board did not provide any regular 
preschool programs, but did have a mixed special education preschool 
classroom in which half the children were nondisabled.163 It was 
proposed that N.R. attend this classroom in the mornings and spend his 
afternoons in a resource room.164 N.R.’s parents rejected this proposed 
placement and asked for tuition and supplemental services at N.R.’s 
private daycare center.165 
The board requested a due process hearing to determine the validity 
of the proposed placement.166 The hearing officer sided with the board; 
N.R.’s parents appealed to the district court, lost there, and appealed 
again.167 
                                                     
158. Id. at 917 n.2. “Head Start is a national program that promotes school readiness by 
enhancing the social and cognitive development of children through the provision of educational, 
health, nutritional, social and other services to enrolled children and families.” About the Office of 
Head Start, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ohs/about/index.html#factsheet (last visited Dec. 18, 
2009). 
159. LaGrange Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d at 917 n.2. 
160. Id. The court concluded by noting that the tuition of seventy-five dollars per month was less 
than the amount the district had planned to expend in bussing Ryan to the segregated class, and 
“certainly less than the attorneys’ fees [the school district] presumably incurred prosecuting the 
appeal.” Id. at 918 (quoting the district court). 
161. 205 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2000). 
162. Id. at 576 & n.1. 
163. Id. at 576. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
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The court of appeals vindicated the parents’ position, holding that the 
mixed classroom did not constitute the least restrictive environment.168 
The mixed class was designed to support children with disabilities, who 
constituted half the class; therefore the court found that it was more 
restrictive than a regular preschool class.169 Because the record 
contained no evidence that N.R.’s IEP could not be successfully 
implemented in a regular class, the board had to consider that option.170 
A few years later, the Tenth Circuit examined facts similar to those 
encountered in Kingwood Township in L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo School 
District.171 K.B. was a preschool child with an autism spectrum disorder 
and, like N.R., was offered a placement in a mixed special education 
preschool which included between thirty and fifty percent nondisabled 
children who served as models to the children with disabilities.172 K.B.’s 
parents rejected the proposed placement and instead enrolled her in a 
regular preschool with an aide and augmented her classroom experience 
with between twenty-five and thirty hours per week of additional 
therapy.173 Seeking reimbursement, K.B.’s parents requested a due 
process hearing.174 The hearing officer decided in favor of the school 
district and the district court affirmed.175 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the school district’s contention 
that K.B.’s reliance on her aide made the regular preschool more 
restrictive than the mixed class,176 finding this argument belied by 
evidence that K.B.’s dependence had decreased and she was behaving 
appropriately at school with minimal prompts from her aide.177 Because 
K.B. was the most academically advanced child at her regular preschool, 
the court viewed that setting as more likely to provide academic benefits 
to her than the mixed classroom, where the average student functioned at 
a lower level.178 Therefore, the mixed classroom was not K.B.’s least 
                                                     
168. Id. at 582. 
169. See id. at 579. 
170. Id. at 579–80. 
171. 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004). 
172. See id. at 968. 
173. See id. 
174. Id. at 969. 
175. Id. at 969–70. 
176. Id. at 977. 
177. See id. at 972. Other factors that persuaded the court that the mixed preschool was not the 
least restrictive environment for K.B. included the fact that the private preschool had a more 
balanced gender ratio and a group of peers better suited to model appropriate social skills. Id. at 
978. 
178. Id. at 978. 
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restrictive environment, and the court further held that her parents were 
entitled to reimbursement for the costs of K.B.’s regular preschool.179 
IV.  WHEN DECIDING LRE CASES, COURTS SHOULD FIRST 
LOOK TO THE CHILD’S PRESUMPTIVE LEAST 
RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT 
A uniform approach to deciding preschool least restrictive 
environment cases is needed. To effectuate the LRE requirement, courts 
should identify the settings where a preschool child’s peers are educated 
as that child’s presumptive least restrictive environment. The child 
should be placed in his or her presumptive least restrictive environment 
unless that placement would be inconsistent with the child’s right to an 
appropriate education. 
A.  The Split Between Courts Considering the LRE Requirements for 
Preschoolers Suggests the Need for a Uniform Test 
The five cases discussed above represent two different approaches 
that are not reconcilable. The courts that found no obligation to provide 
services in more normalized settings engaged in fundamentally different 
inquiries than the courts that found otherwise. The Mark A. and M.W. 
courts—which upheld segregated placements—did so despite evidence 
that the child could succeed in an integrated setting.180 These courts 
accepted a showing that segregated settings conferred some educational 
benefits as sufficient to fulfill the LRE requirement—a requirement they 
seemed to view as having no independent significance once the 
threshold of a substantively appropriate education was met. For 
example, once the court in M.W. determined that M.W. could receive an 
adequate education in the autism preschool program, the court was 
“unclear” whether the less restrictive preschool needed consideration.181 
Similarly, while the Mark A. court acknowledged that Alleah could 
receive an appropriate education in her daycare setting, it refused to 
require the state to provide that setting because it was not a publicly run 
program and her education in the segregated setting was adequate.182 
In contrast, L.B., Kingwood Township, and LaGrange School District 
                                                     
179. Id. 
180. See supra notes 127–128, 142, and accompanying text. 
181. M.W. v. Clarke County Sch. Dist., No. 3:06-CV-49, 2008 WL 4449591, at *9 n.16 (M.D. 
Ga. Sept. 29, 2008). 
182. Mark A. v. Grant Wood Area Educ. Agency, 795 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986). 
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stand for the proposition that a school must justify placing a preschool 
child in a more restrictive classroom based on the child’s needs. Courts 
following these decisions are likely to find that preschool programs 
composed of high numbers of children with disabilities, or children at 
risk of social or academic problems, are more restrictive than programs 
designed for and attended by nondisabled children who are developing 
normally.183 
The latter cases represent a more correct analysis of the LRE 
provisions for two reasons. First, these cases are aligned with Congress’s 
intent because they acknowledge that placing a child in a classroom 
designed for children with disabilities constitutes the “removal . . . from 
the regular educational environment” that demands justification based 
on the child’s needs.184 School districts should not remove disabled 
preschoolers from regular educational environments just because they 
decline to educate nondisabled preschoolers—administrative and 
logistical challenges are not sufficient justifications for segregation. 
Second, these cases implicitly recognize that the LRE requirement is 
analytically separate from the free appropriate public education 
requirement, and the IDEA mandates that states meet both 
requirements.185 
Although these courts recognized that regular preschools are less 
restrictive than special preschools, their analysis was incomplete because 
they did not ask or answer the question of whether the regular preschools 
were in fact the presumptive least restrictive environment. Instead, they 
looked at the possibilities before them—regular and special 
preschools—and deemed the least restrictive option the more appropriate 
placement.186 However, in determining the least restrictive environment 
                                                     
183. But see A.U. ex rel. N.U. v. Roane County Bd. of Educ., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Tenn. 
2007) (holding that placement in a “collaborative” Head Start/special education classroom with fifty 
percent typically developing children would provide a free appropriate public education in the least 
restrictive environment, even though the child’s needs could have been met in a classroom 
consisting of nondisabled children). 
184. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006) (“[R]emoval . . . occurs only when the nature or severity 
of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes . . . cannot be achieved 
satisfactorily.” (emphasis added)). 
185. Although the statutory language suggests that placement in the least restrictive environment 
is a component of determining whether a child has received a free appropriate public education, see 
id. §§ 1401(9), 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V), the Rowley substantive standard for “appropriate” education is 
distinct from whether or not that education also occurs in the least restrictive environment. See Bd. 
of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201, 206–07 (1982). It is possible for a child to have an 
education that meets Rowley’s substantive requirements of appropriateness in a variety of 
environments, but the IDEA additionally requires that the child be placed in the least restrictive 
option where he or she can receive this appropriate education. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
186. See supra part III.B. 
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for a child, courts should instead first determine what the presumptive 
least restrictive environment is—what the IDEA refers to as the “regular 
educational environment”—for similarly aged nondisabled preschool 
children in the community, before determining whether placement in 
that environment would be appropriate for an individual child. 
The grounding historical principle of LRE analysis—normal 
environments whenever possible—suggests that children with 
disabilities should participate in the same environments they would if 
they were nondisabled, so long as their educational needs can be met.187 
To effectuate this principle, courts should use a two-step process to 
identify the presumptive least restrictive environment for a preschool 
child. First, courts should consider the appropriate activities in which the 
child’s same-aged nondisabled peers in the community engage. These 
activities must be identified before placement can be addressed because 
the IDEA requires that, when appropriate, a preschool child’s IEP 
address the ways the disability affects participation in appropriate 
activities.188 Second, courts should consider the settings in which these 
activities occur, because these settings will constitute the child’s 
presumptive least restrictive environment. 
This process mirrors the reasoning implicit in Congress’s position that 
the regular class constitutes the presumptive least restrictive 
environment for school-age children,189 for whom school-based 
education is not only universally available, but also compulsory, in all 
fifty states.190 By contrast, there is no nationwide, standard educational 
environment for nondisabled three- to five-year-old children. Because 
the presumptive least restrictive environment for preschoolers is both 
age- and community-specific, no single option will be the presumptive 
least restrictive environment for all preschool children. Once the 
presumptive least restrictive environment is identified for a child, the 
court must determine if it is the child’s least restrictive environment 
appropriate to his or her needs—a determination that requires 
considering whether the child’s needs can be met in that environment 
                                                     
187. See supra part II.C. 
188. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(bb). 
189. See id. § 1412(a)(5); see also supra Part II.D.3. 
190. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Compulsory Education, http://ncsl.org/ 
default.aspx?tabid=12943 (last visited Dec. 21, 2009) (“Today, every state and territory requires 
children to enroll in public or private education or to be home-schooled. More than half—32 
states—require students to begin their education by age 6. Some states’ [sic] set their age 
requirements as low as age 5 and as high as age 8. All children are required to continue their 
education into their high school years, with 26 states setting the cutoff age at 16. The remaining 
states require students to stay in school through age 17 or 18.”). 
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with supplementary aids and services. 
B.  Preschool Children Engage in Appropriate Activities in a Number 
of Environments, Including Preschool Classes, the Community, 
and the Home 
As set forth in the Section above, the first step in identifying the 
presumptive least restrictive environment for a preschool child is to 
identify the appropriate activities191 that same-aged preschool children in 
the child’s community engage in. Although the IDEA does not define 
the meaning of appropriate activities, the statute’s strong emphasis on 
participation in the general education curriculum, starting in 
kindergarten, anticipates that preschool education will focus on 
preparing children to participate in the general curriculum upon 
kindergarten entry.192 Because of this focus, the IDEA’s requirement that 
IEP teams consider how the disability impacts the child’s participation in 
appropriate activities—before crafting goals addressing the child’s 
educational needs resulting from the disability193—should be understood 
as a requirement to consider those abilities and activities that enable 
preschool children to enter kindergarten and progress in the general 
curriculum. 
Nondisabled children who are kindergarten-ready have social, 
cognitive, and language foundations that they leverage for rapid 
learning. Generally, these children enter kindergarten largely fluent in 
their native language,194 socially aware and able to learn in a group 
setting,195 and competent in basic self-help and motor skills.196 These are 
                                                     
191. The IDEA refers to preschool children participating in “appropriate activities.” See 20 
U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). 
192. Congressional findings note that the education of children with disabilities can be made 
more effective by “having high expectations for such children and ensuring their access to the 
general education curriculum in the regular classroom, to the maximum extent possible, in order 
to . . . be prepared to lead productive and independent adult lives, to the maximum extent possible.” 
Id. § 1400(c)(5). 
193. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(A). 
194. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Powell, Speech and Language: Causes, Milestones and Suggestions 
(2000), http://www.childrensdisabilities.info/speech/guidelines.html (“A five-year-old typically 
understands 2500–2800 words, speaks in 5–8 word sentences, uses 1500–2000 words and tells long 
stories accurately.”). 
195. See Pamela C. High, School Readiness, 121 PEDIATRICS 1008, 1010 (2008) (noting that 77% 
of first-time kindergarteners “often” form friendships). 
196. See, e.g., Ellen H. Parlapiano, Ready for Kindergarten? Five Teachers Tell You What 
Preschoolers Really Need for Next Year, http://www2.scholastic.com/browse/article.jsp?id=701 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2009). 
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some of the appropriate activities that enable nondisabled children to 
begin kindergarten prepared to participate in the general curriculum and 
benefit from regular education. 
Significantly, nondisabled children can acquire most kindergarten-
readiness skills without formal instruction of any kind.197 Before age 
five, these children meet their developmental milestones and engage in 
activities that prepare them for kindergarten in a variety of 
environments, including home, daycare, and other community 
settings.198 These settings, therefore, can all constitute the presumptive 
least restrictive environment for preschoolers with disabilities learning to 
engage in appropriate activities. Unlike the general curriculum delivered 
to school-age children, where instruction takes place almost entirely 
within the schoolhouse, preschoolers engage in appropriate activities 
throughout most of their waking hours. Although instruction in pre-
academic skills may be a focus of preschool classrooms, pre-academic 
skills are a small and relatively unimportant slice of the myriad abilities 
preschool children must develop to begin a general curriculum by 
kindergarten—abilities that are largely acquired outside a formal 
preschool setting.199 
In communities where a preschooler’s nondisabled peers do not 
participate in a structured preschool program, educators should regard 
community settings where nondisabled children engage in appropriate 
activities, such as home and daycare, as constituting the presumptive 
least restrictive environment. Although the continuum regulation 
suggests that home is a fairly restrictive placement,200 this suggestion 
                                                     
197. NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE EDUC. OF YOUNG CHILDREN, SCHOOL READINESS: A POSITION 
STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE EDUCATION OF YOUNG CHILDREN, at 1 
(1995), http://www.naeyc.org/files/naeyc/file/positions/PSREADY98.PDF (“Every child, except in 
the most severe instances of abuse, neglect, or disability, enters school ready to learn school 
content.”). 
198. See Alison Gopnik, Op-Ed., Your Baby is Smarter than You Think, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 
2009, at WK10. The author notes: 
Schoolwork revolves around focus and planning. We set objectives and goals for children, with 
an emphasis on skills they should acquire or information they should know. Children take tests 
to prove that they have absorbed a specific set of skills and facts and have not been distracted 
by other possibilities. This approach may work for children over the age of 5 or so. But babies 
and very young children . . . . aren’t trying to learn one particular skill or set of facts; instead, 
they are drawn to anything new, unexpected or informative. 
Id. 
199. See High, supra note 195, at 1013 (“Three qualities that are necessary for children to be 
ready for school are intellectual skills, motivation to learn, and strong social-emotional capacity and 
support. These qualities are influenced by the health and well-being of the families and 
neighborhoods in which children are raised.”). 
200. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2009). The continuum regulation states that the continuum of 
alternative placements must include “instruction in regular classes, special classes, special schools, 
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should be considered inapplicable to preschoolers for two reasons. First, 
this regulation applies to children ages three through twenty-one; the 
majority of this population is school-age. Bolstering the notion that the 
regulation does not apply to preschoolers is the suggestion that the 
regular class is the normal environment for nondisabled children.201 This 
presumption cannot extend to preschoolers for whom no standard 
“regular class” exists. 
The full context of the IDEA suggests that this regulation should not 
be applied to preschoolers. The Act implies that preschoolers may have a 
different presumptive least restrictive environment than school-age 
children. For example, the statutory language providing that home and 
community settings are least restrictive environments for infants and 
toddlers,202 and allowing a toddler’s service plan to remain in effect until 
age five,203 strongly suggests that community settings, including the 
home, may be a child’s least restrictive environment from birth through 
                                                     
home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions.” Id. The continuum listed is generally 
considered to move from a least restrictive to most restrictive settings, suggesting that home is 
among the more restrictive. See, e.g., D.B. v. Ocean Twp. Bd. of Educ., 985 F. Supp. 457, 490 
(D.N.J. 1997) (“Just as placement in a regular class with supplementary aids and services is at one 
end of the continuum of alternate placements required to be made available to special education 
students under IDEA, placement at a completely segregated, full time residential facility is at the 
other end of that continuum.” (citing Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1400 (D.N.J. 
1992)). 
201. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.115 (2009). This presumption of the home as a highly restrictive 
environment makes sense with respect to school-aged children, because the normal environment for 
these children to learn the general curriculum is the regular class. The continuum becomes more 
restrictive as the setting becomes less and less like a regular class. For example, the next step on the 
continuum is a special class in a regular school, which although more restrictive than a regular class, 
at least has many of the same features that make the regular class the “normal” environment of 
instruction—a community of children, teachers, and a building dedicated to learning. Proceeding 
along the continuum, a special school also has many of the features of a regular class in a regular 
school, and is considerably less restrictive than home. By contrast, homebound instruction is an 
aberrant instructional environment for a school-age child because there is no participation in a 
“class” of any sort, which is the hallmark of formal schooling and delivery of the general 
curriculum. See Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and the Early 
Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers With Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,405, 12,638 
(Dep’t of Educ. Mar. 12, 1999) (“Home instruction is, for school-aged children, the most restrictive 
type of placement because it does not permit education to take place with other children. For that 
reason, home instruction should be relied on as the means of providing FAPE to a school-aged child 
with a disability only in those limited circumstances when they cannot be educated with other 
children even with the use of appropriate related services and supplementary aids and services, such 
as when a child is recovering from surgery.”). 
202. See 20 U.S.C. § 1432(4)(G) (2006) (noting that, to the maximum extent appropriate, early 
intervention services are “provided in natural environments, including the home, and community 
settings in which children without disabilities participate”). 
203. See id. § 1414(d)(2)(B). 
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age five.204 For preschoolers, learning at home may be normalizing 
instead of stigmatizing, and services should be more freely offered in 
this setting when appropriate and in line with the environments in which 
the child’s nondisabled same-age peers participate.205 
Where preschool is a community norm, there may be two concurrent 
least restrictive environments: a regular preschool will constitute the 
presumptive least restrictive environment for delivery of what might be 
called a “quasi-general curriculum,” while community settings will  
likely be the presumptive least restrictive environment for engaging in 
some “appropriate activities.” 
                                                     
204. In 1997, the Department of Education issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in which it 
proposed a “continuum of alternative placements” regulation, identical to the one currently in effect 
with the exception of an explanatory note intended to follow the regulation. Assistance to States for 
the Education of Children with Disabilities, Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, and 
Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,026, 55,107 
(proposed Oct. 22, 1997). The note stated that “[h]ome instruction is usually appropriate for only a 
limited number of children, such as children who are medically fragile and are not able to 
participate in a school setting with other children.” Id. In response, some commentators requested 
that the note be modified to state that home instruction services may be appropriate for young 
children. Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and the Early 
Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers With Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg.12,405, 12,638 (Mar. 
12, 1999). The agency ultimately decided to omit the note, and included in its explanation of the 
deletion that “[i]nstruction at home may be the most natural environment for a young child with a 
disability.” Id. To the extent that the proposed note gave the erroneous impression that home was 
not an appropriate placement for most preschoolers, it was corrected only partly by eliminating it. 
The Department should have gone farther and added a comment to the regulation, explicitly stating 
that the home may very well be the most natural environment for many preschoolers. By leaving 
this acknowledgement buried in a several-hundred page statement of basis and purpose in the 
Federal Register, the Department lost an opportunity to clarify the continuum of alternative 
placements so that it might be more apt for preschoolers. 
205. Additionally, in responding to commentators’ suggestions to the IDEA’s regulations issued 
in 2006, the Department of Education noted that: 
The LRE requirements in §§ 300.114 through 300.118 apply to all children with disabilities, 
including preschool children who are entitled to FAPE. Public agencies that do not operate 
programs for preschool children without disabilities are not required to initiate those programs 
solely to satisfy the LRE requirements of the Act. Public agencies that do not have an inclusive 
public preschool that can provide all the appropriate services and supports must explore 
alternative methods to ensure that the LRE requirements are met. Examples of such alternative 
methods might include placement options in private preschool programs or other community-
based settings. Paying for the placement of qualified preschool children with disabilities in a 
private preschool with children without disabilities is one, but not the only, option available to 
public agencies to meet the LRE requirements. We believe the regulations should allow public 
agencies to choose an appropriate option to meet the LRE requirements. However, if a public 
agency determines that placement in a private preschool program is necessary as a means of 
providing special education and related services to a child with a disability, the program must 
be at no cost to the parent of the child. 
Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for 
Children With Disabilities; Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,589 (Aug. 14, 2006). 
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C.  When a Preschool Classroom Is the Least Restrictive Environment 
for a Child, the Classroom Should Be No More Restrictive than 
Necessary 
Home and other community settings are not necessarily the 
presumptive least restrictive environment possible for all preschoolers. 
As the Ryan B. court suggested, the IDEA’s regulations anticipate that 
regular preschool can be the presumptive least restrictive 
environment.206 Whether regular preschool is a sufficiently normal 
environment such that it constitutes the least restrictive environment 
must be determined by looking to community norms for nondisabled 
children. In a community where the majority of children participate in 
formal preschool before kindergarten, the community has what might be 
described as a “quasi-general curriculum” for preschool-age children. In 
such a community, preschool attendance is likely to be viewed as an 
expected precursor to kindergarten. Furthermore, the absence of a 
preschool experience is likely to be perceived as a significant 
disadvantage because local schools count on incoming kindergarteners 
having more extensive pre-academic skills and exposure to formal 
preschool activities than might be expected in other communities where 
preschool is less common. 
Because the LRE requirement looks first to what is normal for the 
general population, age is also a relevant factor when determining the 
least restrictive environment for a particular child. In a community 
where preschool attendance is expected, regular preschools are likely to 
constitute the least restrictive environment possible for children with 
disabilities of the same age as nondisabled attendees. Thus, if regular 
preschool is available to nondisabled children only when they turn three 
by the start of the school year, a disabled child whose third birthday is in 
December may not have a regular preschool become his presumptive 
least restrictive environment until the following fall. Likewise, if 
nondisabled children do not participate in preschool until their pre-
kindergarten year, preschool may not be the presumptive least restrictive 
environment for a disabled child until age four in that community. 
When preschool is the presumptive least restrictive environment, the 
preschool should be, to the maximum extent appropriate, one that is 
designed for nondisabled children.207 If preschool possibilities were to 
be placed on a continuum from least to most restrictive, regular 
                                                     
206. See supra notes 147–160 and accompanying text. 
207. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
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preschools designed for nondisabled children should be the presumptive 
least restrictive environment, while special preschools designed for and 
attended exclusively by disabled children should be considered highly 
restrictive. Mixed and at-risk programs would fall somewhere in 
between regular and special preschools. 
In communities where the local school district or other educational 
agency does not provide regular preschool to nondisabled children, it is 
likely that the least restrictive preschool option will be private. This may 
mean that the school district or other educational agency must pay 
private tuition for those students who can receive a free appropriate 
public education in a regular preschool. The IDEA does not exempt 
educational agencies from the obligation to provide a free appropriate 
public education in the least restrictive environment on the grounds that 
the school district does not provide regular preschools.208 In fact, the 
IDEA provisions anticipate that agencies will contract with private 
schools when necessary to achieve an appropriate education.209 Agencies 
also have the option of creating public preschools, which could be 
financed at least in part by charging tuition to nondisabled children. 
D.  The Proposed Framework First Identifies the Presumptive Least 
Restrictive Environment, then Asks Whether the Child Can Be 
Educated in This Environment 
Assuming that the IEP has substantively valid goals that are 
reasonably calculated to confer an appropriate education, courts 
reviewing preschool placement should ask three questions when trying 
to determine a preschool child’s least restrictive environment. 
First, is the presumptive least restrictive environment the home and 
community, or is it a preschool setting? The answer to this inquiry will 
depend on whether same-aged nondisabled children generally participate 
in a quasi-general curriculum in a structured preschool setting. If they 
do, then a preschool is the presumptive least restrictive environment. If 
the community does not have a quasi-general curriculum, then the 
presumptive least restrictive environment is the home and community—
the same settings in which nondisabled preschoolers engage in 
appropriate activities. 
After the presumptive least restrictive environment is determined, the 
second question should be: does the nature or severity of the child’s 
disability prevent the child from being satisfactorily educated in this 
                                                     
208. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
209. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29). 
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environment, assuming the use of supplementary aids and services?210 If 
the answer is no, then the presumptive least restrictive environment is 
the child’s least restrictive environment and is the appropriate 
placement. 
The final question should be: is the child included in the regular 
educational environment to the maximum extent appropriate?211 For 
example, if a child requires a special preschool classroom, but could eat 
snack or play on the playground with the regular preschool class, then 
that child should be included in the regular preschool activities to the 
maximum extent appropriate to her needs, instead of remaining in a 
segregated setting. 
By determining the presumptive least restrictive environment for a 
preschool child first, courts will ensure that preschool children with 
disabilities are being educated, insofar as appropriate, in the same 
environments that are normal for their nondisabled peers—which was 
Congress’s primary aim when it enacted the LRE requirements.212 
CONCLUSION 
Courts should reject the approach of the Mark A. and M.W. courts 
when assessing the least restrictive environment for preschoolers. 
However, they must dig deeper than the LaGrange School District, 
Kingwood Township, and Nebo School District courts, which did not 
require a showing that the child participated in the presumptive least 
restrictive environment to the maximum extent appropriate. Instead, 
courts should embrace a community-specific standard where the 
presumptive least restrictive environment is the setting in which a 
preschool child’s same-aged nondisabled peers are being educated. 
When a child can be successfully educated in this setting with the 
provision of supplementary aids and services, the presumptive least 
restrictive environment will determine the child’s placement. 
By using the learning environments of same-aged preschoolers in the 
community as the norm by which the least restrictive environment is 
determined for a preschool child, courts can advance the congressional 
purposes of reducing segregation while remaining true to the child’s 
educational needs. 
 
                                                     
210. See id. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
211. See id. 
212. See supra Part II.D. 
